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发表于 2008-5-29 07:12 AM
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Oil in 2012: $200 or $50?(ZT)
亚洲时报：2012年，油价将走向何处
2008-05-08 00:00:00
提要：
自1月份实行扩张性货币政策至4月14日，美国“零期限”货币年增速达到 30.3%。如果美联储在未来4年继续使货币供应量保持这种增速，到2012年年底，物价涨幅将近236%，如今115美元/桶的价格将等同于2012年的386美元/桶。但如果美联储被迫上调利率，国际市场流动性将萎缩，从而将引发全球经济减速和国际炒家借贷资本规模锐减，进而导致原因需求下降、油价泡沫将会破灭，届时油价回落至50美元/桶。本文认为，后者出现的可能性更大。
(外脑精华·北京）加拿大帝国商业银行全球市场部的分析师们最近预测，随着供应的日趋吃紧，国际油价在2012年时将达到200美元/桶。这意味着未来4年内全球原油市场将仍将维持牛市，从而可能引发通胀。鉴于美元在重蹈1923年德国马克暴跌的覆辙，帝国商业银行的预言或许将会应验。
“零期限”货币大幅增长推动油价涨至200美元
但我认为届时油价回落至50美元/桶的可能性更大。虽然规模空前的原油及大宗商品价格泡沫可能尚未到破灭之时，但肯定已渐行渐近。首先要考虑的是美国出现恶性通胀的可能性。圣路易斯联邦储备银行的统计数据显示，2007年美国“零期限货币”（即货币供应量M2减去小额定期存款再加上机构货币市场基金）温和增长了9.18%。不过，自美联储1月份实行大规模扩张性货币政策以来，在截至2008年4月 14日的3个月中，零期限货币的年增速达到了惊人的30.3%。
如果美联储在未来4年左右的时间里继续使货币供应量保持这种增速，那么，由于货币供应量增长将带动物价上涨，到2012年年底时，物价涨幅将近236%。换言之，如今115美元/桶的价格将等同于2012年的386美元/桶。200美元/桶的价格将意味着油价回落，因为实际油价已降至略高于当前实际油价的50%。如果只有美元一直如此大幅贬值，到2012年时，欧元兑美元汇率将达到1：5，而美元兑日元汇率将达到1：28。
那么，出现这种恶性通胀局面可能性有多大呢？而在不出现恶性通胀的情况下，油价涨至200美元 /桶的可能性有多大呢？是否会出现恶性通胀取决于美联储是否会在未来4年继续使货币供应量增速达到近31%。不能完全排出这种可能性。因为美联储主席本伯南克并不惧怕通胀，而是将房价水平作为衡量美联储政绩的一个重要标准。在这种情况下，为避免房价出现灾难性暴跌，伯南克可能将继续热衷于实行刺激性政策，尽可能将利率降至零区间，毫无节制地从银行体系购买大量抵押房贷债务，以帮助所有陷入困境的银行渡过难关。
11月份选举产生的政府因而将充满民粹主义色彩，这个新政府可能将同美联储一起制定一系列更激进的“一揽子刺激计划”，而美联储倾向于通过扶持国债市场来帮助政府筹集数万亿美元的债务。这或许将为向被视为夺走美国就业岗位的第三世界进口国设置贸易壁垒推波助澜，这些贸易壁垒将不会使多少就业岗位回流至美国，但极可能诱发进口商品价格大幅上涨。美国对国外商品需求的减弱无疑将引发全球其他地区经济衰退，从而促使原油其他大宗商品实际价格回落，但以美元计价的非石油类商品进口价格可能将迅速攀升，从而导致总体物价水平继续上涨。2008年总统选举活动已表明，美国主要选民阶层和政治阶层经济思想的品质在过去10年中已严重退化，以至如今对保护主义思潮泛滥、日元加剧的通胀以及持续激增的政府支出问题放任自流。
利率上扬将导致油价泡沫破灭
因此，只有两大因素可能避免通胀率达到30%和2012年时油价攀升至200美元/桶，一是美联储和政治家们重获良好的判断力（这种可能性不大），二是美国国债市场承销商们发起一次全面抵制运动。后一种情况并未完全不可能发生，因为美国政府债务正在激增，甚至在经济衰退前本年度的政府财政赤字已达到5000亿美元。因此，债券市场将需要吸收大量债务。从某种意义上讲，尽管美国劳动统计局在极尽所能地粉饰通胀数据，但债券持有者和承销商们终将意识到政府向他们兜售的国债的实际收益率为负值。
一场良性的“投资者抵制活动”将会推动国债收益率上涨、可能会迫使贝南克辞职以及美国政策决策者们采取紧缩性货币和财政政策。这是一个令人非常期待的理想结果，唯一令人困惑的是近年来通胀率在稳步攀升，但国债收益率却始终徘徊在2004年时水平。
假设国债市场爆发投资者抵制活动或是美联储和财政部重获良好判断力（可能性不大），通胀率不可能达到30%，因而油价不可能涨至200美元/桶。在这种情况下，利率将上扬驱逐通胀压力。这将导致国际市场流动性减少，从而将产生两种效应：一是引发全球经济减速；二是导致国际炒家借贷资本规模锐减，而投机资本是去年原油、黄金和大宗商品价格上涨的一个愈发重要的推动因素。全球经济增速放缓将对大宗商品市场造成毁灭性打击。投机商破产将使得投机性需求迅速消失，而真实需求也将有所下降。大宗商品价格将下滑至同真实需求相符的水平。
一旦大宗商品需求下降，下降规模将迅速达到历史水平。由于当前高企的粮价已刺激了产量增长，预计在未来12个月时间内，多数粮食作物的产量可能将激增。倡导以玉米为原料生产乙醇的美国政客们也在认识到这种做法的危害性。因此，政府即使不会消除这方面的补贴，也将不会增加补贴。全球粮食消费量只会缓慢增长，由于更加富裕的印度和中国居民肉类消费增长带来的一些变化，全球粮食消费量只会缓慢增长。因此，随着粮食消费增速的进一步放缓，粮食产量很快赶上需求。
黄金和白银价格走势将取决于全球通胀前景。如果在通胀问题真正爆发之前一直维持低利率，可能将导致通胀预期恶化，从而进一步推高黄金和白银价格。即使是利率上扬，政府应对通胀的坚定信心也有可能会逐渐动摇，那么，投机者和投资者可能会继续将黄金和白银作为一个对冲工具。毕竟，随着利率的上扬，股票和债券价格将下跌。因此，他们找不到一个理所当然的替代投资品种。
因此，同预期2012年时油价将涨至200美元一样，黄金价格也很可能将涨至2000美元，尽管2000美元的金价可能只会出现在2012年年初昙花一现。也许通过两年的反通胀，金价总体走势随后将稳步下滑。
需求放缓有助于改善供应状况
最后，需要分析油价本身。两大因素一直在支撑油价上涨。一是持续增长的需求，而原油需求预计将出现相同的发展趋势。随着全球经济减速，需求增长将放缓，而利率上扬将迫使投机者退出原油市场。另外，由于供应状况未得到改观，2012年时的油价仍可能接近当前水平。
全球经济衰退使得原油供应增长更加困难。过去5年来油价的持续飙升已唤醒了石油生产国原始的民族主义，导致他们排斥跨国石油企业，企图使政府赚取尽可能多的石油收入。
寻找新石油资源变得愈发困难，因为在只有少数几个国家的石油企业掌握着现代化勘探技术。甚至连5年前被寄予厚望的俄罗斯，其原油产量在2008年也开始下滑。而自2006年以来，墨西哥、委内瑞拉、尼日利亚的原油减产幅度都超过了10%。
也有一些截然相反的情况，例如，自2003年重新允许跨国石油企业参与本国石油资源勘探开采以来，伊拉克探明的原油储量增加了一倍，而巴西国家石油公司在同跨国石油巨头组建合资企业以来，近期已陆续发现了一些大型新油田。不过，尽管油价在继续攀升，但新原油资源的勘探可能将仅限于少数地缘政治关系前景光明的地区。
一旦原油需求开始下降以及利率上扬，当前形势将出现逆转。委内瑞拉和尼日利亚等经营不善的国家很快将会把石油收入挥霍一空。届时现行政策将会改变，在有效运营和盈利的前提下，大型跨国石油企业将再度获得这些国家的原油勘探和开采权。
油价随之加速回落，俄罗斯和沙特等更为富裕和经营更好的石油生产国也将发现它们身处困境，变得更乐于接受跨国石油企业的帮助。原油需求下滑还将为产能扩张以及克服大规模开采焦油砂和油页岩带来的环境污染问题提供时间。因此，油价最初将缓慢回落，随后可能将呈加速下滑之势，直至产能扩张变得无足轻重以及油价再度远低于其长期边际成本，而当前油价则高于其长期边际成本。
到2012年时，这个过程将只会完成一部分，但在2012年底前油价有可能回落至50美元/ 桶。由于地缘政治冲突加剧地区的原油供应能力受限，油价可能处于一个长期上升通道，但50美元/桶的油价（不出现恶性通胀情况下）已远高于1986年至 2002年期间的实际油价，并应能轻易表明通过对Orinoco和Athabasca地区沥青砂进行高效勘探和加大开采力度足以获取丰厚回报。恰如股价和房价，油价不可能只涨不跌。
英文原文：Oil in 2012: $200 or $50?
CIBC World Markets analysts recently predicted that oil would sell for US$200 a barrel in 2012, as oil supplies grow ever tighter relative to demand. That would imply a continued global boom for the next four years, which would bring inflation, perhaps validating CIBC's prophesy as the dollar went the way of the 1923 Reichsmark.
All the same, that's not the way I'd bet; I think $50 is more likely. We are probably not quite at the end of this unprecedented oil and commodities bubble, but we are surely getting close.
To take the hyperinflationary possibility first. The St Louis Federal Reserve has since 1991 calculated a monetary statistic "money of zero maturity", which is M2 minus small time deposits plus institutional money market funds. In the absence of M3 statistics, discontinued by the Federal Reserve in March 2006, St Louis' MZM is a decent measure of broad money supply. MZM increased by a moderate 9.18% in 2007. However in the three months to April 14 2008, it has increased at an astounding annual rate of 30.3%, reflecting the massively expansionary monetary policy the Fed has followed since January.
If the Fed keeps up that rate of growth for the next four or so years, then, since prices follow monetary growth, by the end of 2012 prices would have risen by about 236%. In other words, to have the same real price as today's $115, oil would sell for $386 per barrel. A price of $200 per barrel would then represent a moderate oil price, reflecting a decline in real oil prices to little more than half today's level in real terms. Needless to say, if the US dollar had been alone in suffering this level of inflation, the euro would in 2012 be selling at over $5 and the yen would be running at $1 = 28 yen.
So how likely is this hyperinflationary scenario, and how likely is $200 oil without it?
The hyperinflationary scenario depends on the Fed continuing to increase money supply by around 31% per annum for the next four years. That's not quite impossible. Consider a world in which Federal Reserve Board chairman Ben Bernanke has little or no fear of inflation, but where house prices are an essential political measure of the Fed's success. In that case, to prevent house prices from catastrophic decline, Bernanke might continue to indulge in stimulatory policies, lowering interest rates as far as practicable towards zero, buying essentially unlimited quantities of dodgy housing debt from the banking system and assisting in bailouts of any banks that got into trouble.
A sloppy populist administration, were such to be elected in November, might ally with the Fed in devising a series of ever-more expansionary "stimulus packages" while prevailing on the Fed to support the Treasury bond market to help it fund its trillion dollar deficits. It might assist the process by erecting trade barriers against Third World imports, which would be seen as taking away jobs; such barriers would restore few jobs but might well produce huge increases in import prices. The rest of the world would doubtless go into recession as the US withdrew partially from the world market, so oil and other commodity prices would decline in real terms, but the dollar prices of non-oil imports could be rising so rapidly that the overall price level continued to inflate.
Sound horribly plausible? I'm rather afraid it is. The 2008 campaign has shown that the quality of economic thought among both the US primary electorate and the political class has deteriorated markedly in the past decade, so that there are few barriers today to rampant protectionism, rising inflation and ever-increasing government spending. There are counterproductive policies of the 1930s through the 1970s that would probably be avoided today, but not many of them.
There are thus only two factors that may save us from 30% inflation and $200 oil by 2012: a revival of good sense by the Fed and the politicians （very unlikely） or a full-scale revolt by dealers in the US Treasury bond market. The latter is not at all improbable; the government's borrowing is increasing substantially, with the current year's deficit heading towards $500 billion even before recession has properly taken hold, so bond markets are going to be asked to absorb a LOT of debt. At some point, even with the Bureau of Labor Statistics doing everything it can to massage inflation figures, bondholders and dealers will come to realize that they are being asked to buy Treasury bonds that yield less than zero in real terms.
A good healthy "buyers' strike" would then push up Treasury bond yields, probably forcing Bernanke's resignation （as it did the resignation of his predecessor G William Miller in 1979） and force a tighter monetary and fiscal policy on the US powers that be. It is a consummation devoutly to be wished; one's only doubt is that inflation has been rising steadily now for several years and yet Treasury bond yields remain stubbornly around their levels of 2004. Continued heavy buying by the less than stellar intellects of Middle Eastern and Asian cash-rich central banks could prevent a catharsis that all should desire.
Assuming that we get a buyers' strike in the Treasury bond market or （less likely） a revival of good sense in the Fed and Treasury, inflation is unlikely to soar to over 30% and thus oil is unlikely to trade around $200. In such an event, interest rates would be increased to begin the lengthy task of wringing inflationary forces out of the system. That would reduce the flood of liquidity in international markets, which would have two effects. First, it would reduce the rate of world growth, affecting particularly those countries such as India and Latin America whose fiscal （India） or balance of payments （most of Latin America） position was already somewhat weak.
Second, it would greatly reduce the loan capital available to international speculators, which have been an increasingly important factor in rising oil, gold and commodity prices in the last year. There are reports that hedge funds have already been compelled to reduce their leverage to a maximum of five times capital. I would tend to be skeptical of such reports, but clearly if interest rates were forced upwards the arithmetic both for hedge funds and for those who lend to them would change radically.
That scenario, of slowing world growth, particularly in markets with heavy real estate exposure （such as the US, Britain, Spain and Ireland） or in over-leveraged emerging markets, would be devastating for commodities markets. Speculative demand would quickly be removed from them, partly because of the bankruptcy of the speculators, and real demand would also be somewhat reduced. Commodity prices would fall towards equilibrium levels.
In the case of soft commodities, the fall towards historic levels would be rapid. Production is already being ramped up because of current high prices, so it is likely that in 12 months time there will be a glut of most crops. The ethanol from corn politically inspired disaster is registering even in the minds of US politicians, so even if the bizarre and counterproductive US subsidies for that process are not repealed, they will not be extended. World food consumption is increasing only relatively slowly, with some change in mix as wealthier Indians and Chinese eat more meat, so with a further slowing in consumption growth it will take very little time for production to catch up.
For gold and silver, the trend depends on the outlook for global inflation. If low interest rates are allowed to persist until inflation has got a real grip, it is likely that inflationary expectations will worsen, driving up gold and silver prices further.
Even when interest rates are raised, confidence in government firmness against inflation will probably be slow to revive, so speculators and investors may continue to hold gold and silver as a hedge - after all, with rising interest rates stock and bond prices will be declining, so there won't be an obvious alternative home for their money.
Thus the equivalent 2012 prediction to $200 oil, $2,000 gold, may very well be possible, although it is likely that such a price will be seen only early in the year, with the overall trend by then, perhaps two years into the fight against inflation, being firmly downwards.
Finally, the oil price itself. Two factors have been driving the rise in oil prices. One, rising demand, has been discussed in relation to food and can be expected to follow the same pattern. As the world economy slows, demand will increase more slowly, while the speculators will be squeezed out of the market by higher interest rates. Nevertheless, absent changes on the supply side, one might still postulate 2012's oil prices to be close to current levels.
It is on the supply side that a global recession makes the most difference. Here the continually rising price of oil over the past five years has awakened primitive nationalism in oil-producing countries, causing them to maltreat foreign oil companies and attempt to squeeze as much government revenue as possible out of the oil goose that is laying so many golden eggs.
New oil discoveries are becoming more and more difficult because in only a few countries are oil companies with modern exploration techniques given the right incentives to search aggressively for oil. Even Russia, the white hope for greater oil production five years ago, has seen its production begin to decline in 2008, while Mexico （closed oil sector）, Venezuela （socialist fruitcake） and Nigeria （kleptomaniac government that taxes oil revenues at 98%） have all seen oil production decline by more than 10% since 2006.
There are a few counterexamples: Iraq's oil reserves have doubled since that country was reopened to international exploration in 2003, while Brazil, whose Petrobras enters freely into joint venture agreements with Big Oil, has made major new oil discoveries recently. However, while oil prices continue to rise the search for new oil sources is likely to be restricted to only a limited number of geologically promising areas.
Once oil demand starts to tail off and interest rates rise, the current situation will reverse. Badly run countries such as Venezuela and Nigeria will quickly run out of money. Current policy will then be reversed, and the major oil companies will once again be allowed to explore and produce on an efficient and profitable basis.
Oil prices will then decline more rapidly, and wealthier and better-run oil producers such as Russia and Saudi Arabia will also find themselves in difficulty and become less recalcitrant in international politics and less resistant to help from the multinational oil companies.
Slackening oil demand will also give time for new supply to come on stream and for environmental objections to massive supply from tar sands and oil shale to be overcome. The result, as in 1981-86 will be a decline in oil prices, gradual at first but probably accelerating until a floor is reached at which new exploration becomes pointless and the oil price is once again as far below its long term marginal cost as it is today above it.
By 2012, that process will only have gone part way; nevertheless an oil price of $50 before the end of that year seems probable. Oil prices may well be on a long-term upward trend, as supplies become restricted to geologically and politically more difficult areas, but $50 per barrel is already （absent hyperinflation） well above the real oil price in 1986-2002 and should easily prove sufficient to reward both efficient exploration and more intensive production from the tar sands of Orinoco and Athabasca.
Just as in stocks and housing, the price of oil cannot go up forever.
Martin Hutchinson is the author of Great Conservatives （Academica Press, 2005）
- details can be found at www.greatconservatives.com.
来源：亚洲时报，2008.04.30，作者：Martin Hutchinson
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