本帖最后由 多吉 于 2009-7-15 08:30 编辑
187# 多吉
How much do you want to bet this won't happen? 
colderdown 发表于 2009-7-15 12:01 AM 
I don't know...But,
I DO know that
there're less than 2% people, including O8/GS,
who are dying for such a scenario lying ahead...
你想想，O8一再拒绝出台第二轮经济刺激政策，是不是留了个后手呢？
进可以攻，退可以守。。。
奥巴马为何拒绝出台第二轮经济刺激政策
2009年07月15日 11:27
中新网7月15日电 由于美国多项经济数据不如预期，市场悲观情绪加剧，要求推出新的经济刺激计划，奥巴马访俄时曾表示，第二轮财经刺激计划并无必要，但也不排除推出的可能；然而，7月11日奥巴马通过电台对美国民众发表演讲时，却明确否定了这种可能性。美国《侨报》14日发表署名文章，对奥巴马的做法进行了分析。文章摘录如下：
7月2日，美国劳工部公布了6月份全美就业报告。数据显示，当月美国非农业部门就业岗位减少46.7万个，远高于前一个月的32.2万人；失业率从5月份的9.4%升至9.5%，为26年来的最高点。如果加上900万“非自愿性”半失业劳工，6月份美国失业率将高达16.5%。此外，美国大企业联合会6月份消费者信心指数也终结了最近几个月以来的连续升势，掉头向下降至49.3。
这些关键数据的恶化程度大大超出了此前市场预期，犹如一盆凉水，浇熄了今年3月以来美国和全球对经济复苏萌芽的高涨热情。随着美元避险功能回归和原油等大宗商品价格回落，关于“W”或“L”型走势的悲观看法渐渐重新占据上风。
更迫在眉睫的是，继加州7月1日宣布进入财政紧急状态后，目前至少还有18个州也正面临下一个财年无米下锅的窘境，其中一些州已处于破产边缘。但这还不算最糟的。由于无法说服美国联邦储蓄保险公司(FDIC)批准其发行政府担保债券，美国最大的商业贷款公司CIT集团随时可能走向破产保护。而一旦其倒下，将迅速波及近百万家美国中小型企业，破坏性不亚于去年7月的雷曼兄弟事件和9月的AIG事件，传说中的第二波金融海啸或许真要降临了。
在此情况下，奥巴马应对经济危机顾问小组成员劳拉•泰森公开提出，今年2月份出台的7870亿美元财政刺激计划规模有限，效果不明显，应考虑起草新一轮财政刺激计划；同时，股神沃伦•巴菲特和诺贝尔经济学奖得主保罗•克鲁格曼都呼吁奥巴马政府应考虑第二轮财政刺激方案；而在民主党党内，许多左翼人士也开始焦躁不安，不断向奥巴马施加压力。
奥巴马却否定了这种可能性。此外，近日副总统拜登和白宫经济顾问委员会主席克里斯蒂娜•罗默也都先后附和了奥巴马的看法。而一些经济学家也反对急于出台第二轮刺激方案，或是担心将进一步强化通胀预期，或是不愿意看到大规模政府投资对私人投资形成挤出之势。
如何解读奥巴马团队内部的这种分歧，以及奥巴马表态的前后不一致？
首先，如果现在就谈第二轮刺激计划，无异于奥巴马承认第一轮财政刺激方案彻底失败。早在2月签订刺激方案时，奥巴马的经济顾问委员们都预计，会把失业率控制在8%以内。但实际情况却是美国新增了200万失业人群，目前失业率高达9.5%，而市场普遍预计2010年失业率将保持在10%以上。不过，奥巴马强调，仅凭过去四个多月时间就下断言过于草率，整个刺激计划作用完全显现至少需要两年时间。
其次，奥巴马政府第一轮7870亿美元财政刺激计划的资金发放速度过慢，目前仅支出11%，且主要是减税和转移支付部分，基础设施建设、新能源等政府投资项目进展缓慢。根据计划，这笔钱有可能要用到2010年底、甚至2011年以后。不过，由于7870亿美元的具体用途事先早已分配好，基础设施投资仅占18%。因此，这与泰森关于第二轮计划应以基础设施投资为主的建议并不矛盾。一些美国学者的研究表明，每1美元的减税或转移支付对GDP的拉动不足1美元，并且其效果要在两年内才能完全显现。而政府投资的见效则要快上许多，1美元投入可以拉动1.57美元的GDP增长。
再次，奥巴马深知，眼下要想在国会中讨论并通过第二轮财政刺激计划，势必遭遇层层阻力。不仅共和党议员将站出来坚决反对，一些民主党内保守派也对此顾虑重重。更要命的是，目前美国舆论对此也普遍不买账。《华尔街日报》日前对51位经济学家进行了调查，除8人表示有必要推出更多刺激举措外，多数经济学家认为尽管明年失业率可能创出新高，但当前并不需要新一轮的刺激计划。
最后，奥巴马政府再要透支或举债，国内外压力都很大。一方面，各国在继续购买美国国债问题上日趋谨慎，并督促美国采取负责任态度对美债价值做出担保；另一方面，很可能再次出现1994年美国内债市投资者由于不满政府扩张货币政策推高通胀罢买国债，迫使国债利率大幅上升。
当然，细读奥巴马最近几次发言，会发现他其实并未把话说死。美国白宫财政问题高级顾问戴维•阿克塞尔罗德在6月底的一段表态颇耐人回味。他表示如有必要，奥巴马可能会讨论第二轮刺激计划；但在此之前，应先观察一下此前举措的成效，“到秋天再看看情况如何”。
笔者认为，某种程度上这或许可代表奥巴马的真实想法。也就是说，今年四季度当失业率突破10%，加之国内民意对于进一步刺激经济的紧迫感凝聚共识后，奥巴马才有可能再次转变政策风向。(刘涛)
Some words from GS
Some commentators criticize the US economic policy response to the crisis because they believe that it prevents (or at least postpones) the necessary adjustment of financial imbalances. This view is very widespread. Its proponents are found on both sides of the political spectrum as well as both sides of the inflation/deflation debate.
· But the data do not support it. Whether we look at the increase in the private sector financial balance, the decline in borrowing, or the drop in the trade deficit, the US economy is undergoing a massive adjustment. Thus, the unprecedented fiscal and monetary policy expansion has only provided a partial offset to the even more unprecedented private sector retrenchment.
· The extent of the adjustment and the scale of the “collateral damage” to employment and living standards suggest that the appropriate debate is not whether fiscal and monetary expansion is appropriate in principle but whether it has been sufficiently aggressive. In our view, further stimulus remains appropriate but we don’t expect much from policymakers in this regard, at least in the near term.
Many commentators criticize the expansionary policies adopted by the Federal Reserve and the Obama administration. They argue that monetary and fiscal stimulus are preventing the necessary adjustment of the US financial imbalances, with potentially dire consequences. This view is so widespread that its proponents are found on both sides of the political spectrum, as well as both sides of the inflation/deflation debate. The common thread is that monetary and fiscal stimulus may lessen the pain in the present but will cause even more pain in the future. The economy just needs to “take the pain,” in this view.
A good example can be found in a recent blog comment by former IMF chief economist Simon Johnson on a newspaper interview with NEC director Lawrence Summers (see http://baselinescenario.com/2009 ... umptions/#more-4332). In the interview, Summers argues that the current US predicament differs from an emerging market crisis and “…has more in common, at least qualitatively, with the Japanese post-bubble problem, where the issue was not reassuring foreigners but maintaining sufficient domestic demand to push the economy forward.” In Johnson’s view, the crisis does have parallels with an emerging market crisis or for that matter the 1970s experience in the US. He says that “…there has been a permanent shock…to which we should adjust, and if we attempt to postpone that adjustment excessively through overexpansionary macro policies, we’ll experience a great deal of inflation.”
However, a look at the data shows that the US economy is in fact undergoing a massive adjustment, despite the sharp turn toward monetary and fiscal expansion. Consider the following observations:
1. A sharp private spending retrenchment. The private sector financial balance—defined as the difference between private saving and private investment, or equivalently between private income and private spending—has risen from -3.6% of GDP in the 2006Q3 to +5.6% in 2009Q1. This 8.2% of GDP adjustment is already by far the biggest in postwar history and is in fact bigger than the increase seen in the early 1930s. (Note that the 1929-1947 are only available at an annual frequency.) The increase implies that spending has plunged relative to income and investment (especially construction investment) has plunged relative to saving. Moreover, judging from the ongoing increase in the personal saving rate, 2009Q2 probably saw a further surge in the private sector balance.
2. A collapse in borrowing. Consistent with the private spending retrenchment, debt among households and nonfinancial businesses is actually declining for the first time on record (the data go back to 1952). Debt growth has fallen from +10.6% (annualized) in 2006Q1 to -0.7% in 2009Q1. Moreover, total nonfinancial debt growth has also slowed from a peak of 9.9% (annualized) in 2005Q4 to 4.3% in 2009Q1, as the increase in Treasury borrowing has only partially offset the collapse in the private sector. Finally, total debt—nonfinancial and financial—is shrinking rapidly, even if we include the federal government.
3. A sharp decline in global trade imbalances. The US private sector retrenchment has also translated into a sharp drop in the US trade and current account deficit. From August 2006 to May 2009, the trade deficit in goods and services has declined from 6.2% of GDP to 2.2% of GDP. Moreover, much of this decline is matched by a sharp drop in trade surpluses in China, Japan, and Germany. Hence, it appears that global trade imbalances have in fact corrected quite quickly.
These observations suggest that the turn toward monetary and fiscal expansion has at most provided a partial offset to the unprecedented private retrenchment. Indeed, the extent of the adjustment and the scale of the “collateral damage” to employment and living standards suggest that the appropriate debate is not whether fiscal and monetary expansion is warranted in principle but whether it needs to be stepped up.
While unemployment continues to increase and core inflation continues to fall, the answer is that further stimulus remains appropriate. But the prospects that we will actually see this are limited, at least in the near term. On the monetary policy side, Fed officials seem reluctant to expand the move toward unconventional easing. This is partly because they seem to have gotten a bit more optimistic about the economy, partly because of worries about the “exit” problem, and partly because the impact of the asset purchase program on financial conditions has been limited. On the fiscal policy side, the obstacles are mostly political as the Obama administration seems to believe that it is simply too soon to call for another stimulus program. Ultimately, we do expect further stimulus, but it may take significant disappointments in the economic data and the financial markets before policymakers move further in this direction.
Jan Hatzius |
狗仔卡
发表于 2009-7-14 07:41 PM
发表于 2009-7-14 08:50 PM
