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本帖最后由 colderdown 于 2009-4-19 10:24 编辑
先讲个事，去年十月五号起，一个单子，$１９７M market price fire sell，花了三天才清空，接着是十月十四，十五号，又用market price买回。这一出一进，差了多少？你认为你的FA, TA会比这个金主或他的顾问强很多吗？greed and fear, 这才是真正的考验。牛熊在这个时刻更需要的是安静下来。
先看看对牛有利的地方：
１。去年十一月，民调结果是７７％的美国人相信今年经济会更糟糕，８３％认为美国走向错误。现在，只有５１％的人相信２０１０年经济会更糟糕，４８％的人相信美国还在犯错误。心态的变化已经向乐观转移，这才是牛牛们真正的核武器。
２。到底是萧条还是衰退，起码官方说仅仅是衰退，看看这段。From Russell Napier, economic historian:
Have a look at Bloomberg quote from President of Kansas City Fed. He is saying 'few' of the US biggest 19 banks need further government intervention. This is the first indication of how the stress tests are shaping up. Bottom line is no more government intervention means the equity in the bank survives. If he speaks with knowledge of how the stress tests are shaping up (he clearly implies that he does) this is very important news and lifts a big negative which was overhanging the
market. Bear markets end when the deflation risk passes. If the US has a banking system with sufficient capital to see it through the cycle while expanding credit (aim of the stress test) then this is almost guaranteed to be a recession and not a depression. Very good news for the market.
'Bulls make money, bears make money but hogs get slaughtered'- attributed to Daniel Drew. If the stress test is really going to go as well as Hoening suggests then it is very dangerous to be still short equities.
Not every piece of news is important but if this is a lead indicator on the stress tests it is very important.
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Sent From KimBerry
如果仅仅是衰退的话，market oversold, period.
3.南加房市有稳定的迹象，尤其是San Diego，这个城市的房市走向往往领先全美一年到一年半。
４。Tox assets, M2M等大家讲了很多，就不多罗嗦了。
所以熊熊们不要在这个时候当英雄，更不要动不动满仓什么的。
对熊有利的地方：
１。Equity loss到现在是$22T，印了$1T，如能进入流通，通过放大，往多里说也就$8T，还远远不够。所以说FED印钱了就如何如何，结论还下得早了些。
２。金融业面临更多的regulation，很多影子银行，如PE,HF都将不存在。难以想象昔日辉煌能从来，如按82年以前银行的PE来算，现在的银行股不是太便宜，而是太贵。真正能还TARP的大概只有GS，为什么呢？大家自己去研究一下准备金的问题吧。
３。Bond investors are smarter.看看corporate bond吧。“New research shows corporate bonds have been far better at predicting where the economy is headed than anyone thought. Unfortunately, that suggests the economy is going to get much worse.
In the fall of 2007, before the economy began to falter, corporate-bond prices were signaling all was not well. The spread between corporate-bond yields and Treasury yields, which had begun to widen amid that summer's mortgage woes, showed little improvement even as the Dow Jones Industrial Average clocked record highs.
It wasn't the first time bonds had signaled something was awry. One of the head scratchers of early 2000 was why stocks were surging when high-yield bonds were wavering. In retrospect, the bonds had it right.
Bond investors are intensely focused on companies' ability to pay down debt. If they see signs business is slowing, they demand higher returns, and thus higher bond yields. Widening corporate-bond spreads can also reflect disruptions in the credit supply -- say, because banks are mired in bad mortgages -- that eventually sap the whole economy. Finally, widening spreads can induce companies to cut back on expansion plans, which also has economic consequences.
Bonds' forecasts haven't always seemed to come true. Many corporate-bond indexes showed spreads widening significantly during the 1998 Russian debt crisis, and yet the economy soldiered on.
Such false signals mightn't be because of corporate bonds themselves, however, but the way corporate-bond indexes are constructed. The bonds in them tend to have much shorter times before they will mature than the 10-year Treasurys that their yields are usually compared with -- which makes for a faulty comparison.
To compensate for that, economists Simon Gilchrist and Vladimir Yankov at Boston University, and Egon Zakrajsek at the Federal Reserve constructed credit spreads over the 1990-2008 period from monthly price data on the corporate debt of about 900 U.S. nonfinancial companies. They divvied up the bonds based on both expected default rates (a more timely measure of quality than ratings) and time to maturity.
In a forthcoming paper in the Journal of Monetary Economics they show that spreads on low- to medium-risk corporate bonds, particularly those with 15 or more years until maturity, predicted changes in the economy phenomenally well, forecasting the ups and downs in both hiring and production a year before they occurred. Since writing the paper, they extended their analysis back to 1973 and found bonds' predictive ability still held.
It would be better for everyone if it doesn't hold in the future. With the massive widening in corporate-bond spreads last fall, the economists' model predicts industrial production will fall another 17% by the end of the year, and the economy will lose another 7.8 million jobs on top of the 5.1 million it has shed since the recession began.”
４。不要指望宏观经济指标近期能有什么改善，O8的经济振兴计划切不不说是不是个笑话，哪怕管用，很多项目也要两三年后才到位。而更能吓破牛胆的是这个GS的分析结论：
The last two global recessions were both triggered by the bursting of asset bubbles, first an equity bubble earlier this decade and now a housing bubble.
The current recession in particular is likely to cause central banks to shift towards a more proactive stance in dealing with asset bubbles.
As this happens, central banks are apt to pay more attention to broad measures of financial conditions such as those reflected in our FCIs.
While greater attention to asset bubbles is unlikely to alter the timing of initial policy rate hikes, once policymakers start tightening, they may seek to normalize rates more quickly than in past episodes.
牛牛们要小心啊！！！！ |
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发表于 2009-4-19 09:16 AM
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