这是选·美的第381篇文章
本文作者林垚。本文于2016年5月23日首发于会员通讯。
相关阅读:堕胎权漫谈(一)惩罚医生还是惩罚孕妇 会员通讯:堕胎权漫谈—未完结的完结篇
昨天的通讯说到,一个彻头彻尾的反堕胎权主义者,可以秉持一种看起来无懈可击的逻辑:「胎儿是人,堕胎是杀人;如果说杀人要被禁止、被惩罚,那么堕胎同样也要被禁止、被惩罚」。
堕胎权的支持者可以沿着两种不同的思路,来反驳上面这个推理。一种是去争论「胎儿究竟算不算『人』;在什么意义上、什么情况下可以算作是『人』」。另一种是让步式的,搁置「胎儿算不算『人』」这个问题,去论述「就算胎儿是人,堕胎也不应当被禁止、被惩罚」。今天的通讯先聊聊后一种思路,下回再谈前一种。
在现实中,并不是任何情况下的「杀人」都会被禁止、被惩罚。比如刽子手依法处决死刑犯、交战时杀死未投降的敌方士兵、平时出于正当防卫而杀人等等。不同人可能对什么情况下可以杀人有不同看法(比如有人反对死刑、有人反对战争),但至少大家会有一个抽象的共识:在某些特定的情况下,杀人是应当被容许的。
这就引出了堕胎权支持者的让步式的思路:即便承认胎儿是「人」、承认堕胎是杀人,堕胎也仍然属于「应当被容许的杀人」范围之内。这里关键在于:怎么论证堕胎是「应当被容许」的杀人?
在这个问题上,较早、较有名、影响较大的一个论证,是由哲学家、法学家茱迪丝·汤姆森(Judith Jarvis Thomson)在其1971年论文〈A Defense of Abortion〉中提出的「小提琴手思想实验」:
You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed with an unconscious violinist. A famous unconscious violinist. He has been found to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers has canvassed all the available medical records and found that you alone have the right blood type to help. They have therefore kidnapped you, and last night the violinist's circulatory system was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your own. The director of the hospital now tells you, "Look, we're sorry the Society of Music Lovers did this to you–we would never have permitted it if we had known. But still, they did it, and the violinist is now plugged into you. To unplug you would be to kill him. But never mind, it's only for nine months. By then he will have recovered from his ailment, and can safely be unplugged from you." Is it morally incumbent on you to accede to this situation? No doubt it would be very nice of you if you did, a great kindness. But do you have to accede to it? What if it were not nine months, but nine years? Or longer still? What if the director of the hospital says. "Tough luck. I agree. but now you've got to stay in bed, with the violinist plugged into you, for the rest of your life. Because remember this. All persons have a right to life, and violinists are persons. Granted you have a right to decide what happens in and to your body, but a person's right to life outweighs your right to decide what happens in and to your body. So you cannot ever be unplugged from him." I imagine you would regard this as outrageous, which suggests that something really is wrong with that plausible-sounding argument I mentioned a moment ago.
简而言之,汤姆森的结论是:就算胎儿有「生命权」,也并不意味着「维持胎儿生命」构成孕妇本人的义务,而需要以尊重孕妇本人的意愿——或者说「选择权」——为前提;就像不能因为重病缠身的小提琴手有「生命权」,便强迫一个不情不愿的人花费九个月的时间和自己的身体去「维持这位小提琴手的生命」一样。
就像所有的哲学论证一样,汤姆森的思想实验也引来了各方面的批评与辩护,这里不能尽述。2003 年 David Boonin 所著《A Defense of Abortion》一书的第四章〈The Good Samaritan Argument〉(第133-281页)详细整理、分析了对汤姆森论证的各种反驳,感兴趣的读者可以翻阅(剧透:Boonin认为,尽管汤姆森的原始版本存在一些问题,但经过恰当修正后,就能有效回击所有的反驳)。
这里特别提一下其中一类在现实政治中很有影响力的反驳,即在「默示同意(tacit consent)」基础上发展出来的「强奸例外论」:倘若一名女性自愿地参与了一次没有采取避孕措施的性行为,就意味着她「默示同意」了接受这次性行为所带来的所有可预期后果(包括怀孕),也就「默示同意」了承担起维持胎儿生命的义务。根据这种推理,只有在遭到强奸怀孕等「非自愿」情况下,堕胎才可以允许、也能够被「小提琴手思想实验」支持;但是「小提琴手思想实验」并不能支持其它情况下的、更为一般性的堕胎权。借用 David Boonin 的总结:
The tacit consent objection turns on two claims: that because the woman’s act of intercourse is voluntary, she should be understood as having tacitly consented to something with respect to the state of affairs in which there is now a fetus developing inside of her body, and that what she should be understood as having tacitly consented to with respect to this state of affairs is, in particular, the fetus’s having a right to have the state of affairs continue for as long as this is necessary for it to remain alive. (第153-154页)
「强奸例外论」作为一种「温和」立场,一度在反堕胎权派中占据主流地位。从禁止联邦经费用于堕胎的「海德修正案」,到一部分州的反堕胎法案,都包括有「除强奸、乱伦或危及孕妇生命的怀孕之外」之类条款。不过近年来随着共和党内宗教保守主义势力的愈发强硬,「反堕胎无例外」的论调在党内越来越有市场。2012 年大选时,共和党时任众议员 Todd Akin 宣称只要是「真正的强奸(legitimate rape)」就绝不可能导致怀孕、凡是怀孕的肯定至少半推半就;另一位共和党参议院候选人 Richard Mourdock 宣称强奸怀孕也是上帝的意愿、不可以违背。这些言论在当时引起轩然大波,但也反映了保守派内部的潮流,以至于到了今年大选,不仅克鲁兹这种极端茶党代言人,就连本来有意争取中间选民的卢比奥都在总统候选人辩论中公开宣布支持「无例外论」。
其实就实践效果看,各州反堕胎法案中所包含的「例外条款」也基本上是形同虚设:本来在男权社会中,被强奸的女性就畏于社会舆论而很少报案;等到过段时间发现自己怀孕后,又要面对 Akin 式的怀疑目光、证明自己怀孕是因为遭遇了「真正的强奸」而不是「半推半就」的结果(讽刺的是,越是保守派掌权、从而越是反堕胎的州,这种 Akin 式的怀疑就越盛行):
It's not so difficult to imagine the policy of rape exceptions devolving into a power struggle where rape survivors must prove themselves and their experiences to skeptical audiences. In fact, we're not so far away from that policy world already.
那么,堕胎权的支持者如何从理论上反击用「默示同意」和「强奸例外论」作为掩护的反堕胎权立场呢?其实汤姆森本人在论文中已经对「强奸例外论」有所回应:
In this case, of course, you were kidnapped, you didn't volunteer for the operation that plugged the violinist into your kidneys. Can those who oppose abortion on the ground I mentioned make an exception for a pregnancy due to rape? Certainly. They can say that persons have a right to life only if they didn't come into existence because of rape; or they can say that all persons have a right to life, but that some have less of a right to life than others, in particular, that those who came into existence because of rape have less. But these statements have a rather unpleasant sound. Surely the question of whether you have a right to life at all, or how much of it you have, shouldn't turn on the question of whether or not you are a product of a rape. And in fact the people who oppose abortion on the ground I mentioned do not make this distinction, and hence do not make an exception in case of rape.
不过她的这个回应稍嫌粗糙——毕竟「默示同意」论者可以辩称,「强奸」和「自愿性交」的差异,影响的不是「胎儿的生命权」本身,而是「维持胎儿生命」是否构成孕妇个人的义务。
即便如此,反堕胎权主义者从「默示同意」到「强奸例外论」的推理仍然破绽重重。Boonin 书中(第148-167页)对此有细致的分析,这里恕不赘述,仅举一例:
Suppose that because of your unique compatibility, the violinist will die unless you undergo a series of nine painful bone marrow extractions over the next nine months, and with a clear understanding of the nature of the procedure and its potential risks, you freely volunteer to undergo the first extraction. After the second round of extraction, however, you find that the burden is considerably more than you are willing to bear on his behalf. Do you really believe that it would now be morally impermissible for you to discontinue providing aid to the violinist merely because you began providing aid voluntarily? To say that doing so would be impermissible would be to say that the violinist’s right to life does not entitle him to seven more extractions of bone marrow from you if the first two were done involuntarily, but that it does entitle him to seven more extractions from you if the first two were done voluntarily.(第165页)
自愿搭救这位小提琴手,当然是好事一桩,但如果中途转变想法不愿再帮下去,别人也没什么资格阻拦——除非一种情况:你一开始的自愿搭救导致产生某种新的排他性(并且你也知道这一点),亦即如果你一开始不搭救的话,别人是完全可以搭救的;但你一搭救之后,这位小提琴手的身体就产生了排异反应,导致之后别人再也救不得。这样的话,可能你一开始的自愿搭救确实意味着你必须一救到底。但孕妇与胎儿的关系显然不是这种情况。如果一开始不怀孕,胎儿根本就不可能存在,也就不存在「你没有怀上这个胎儿的话别人就可以怀上同一个胎儿」的可能性。换句话说,即便「自愿性交」意味着「默示同意」,这个「默示同意」的内容最多也只是「同意承担堕胎带来的可能的身心痛苦」而已,并不能直接得出「同意维持胎儿生命直至其出生」。
希望以上对相关哲学讨论的粗略介绍并不让你太过厌烦,因为我将在下一篇中接着介绍「胎儿究竟算不算人、究竟有没有生命权」这样一个恐怕更为抽象的问题。
http://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/Phil160,Fall02/thomson.htm
https://ethicslab.georgetown.edu/phil553/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/David-Boonin-A-Defense-of-Abortion.pdf
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyde_Amendment
https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/spibs/spib_PLTA.pdf
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rape_and_pregnancy_controversies_in_United_States_elections,_2012
http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/cruz-makes-his-case-against-abortion-rape-exception
http://time.com/4211007/republican-debate-abortion-rape-new-hampshire/
http://www.theatlantic.com/sexes/archive/2012/11/the-problem-with-rape-exceptions/264470/
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/21/rape-study-report-america-us_n_4310765.html
http://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/Phil160,Fall02/thomson.htm